This paper examines strategic tax setting between fiscal authorities in the presence of mobile workers who locate across these jurisdictions in response to differing tax structures and congestable local public amenities. We find that the nature of the tax setting outcomes depend crucially on the...

In this paper we develop a framework for studying tax competition and local public goods supply in a setting where real and fiscal externalities interact with local democracy. We use the framework (a) to analyse if there is any reason to believe that local autonomy generally will give a tax race...

This paper examines the efficient provision of local public goods when jurisdictions compete for both domestic and foreign capital. Capital is freely mobile between jurisdictions in the home country, but capital owners will incur migration costs if investing abroad. Since the supply of foreign...

Luxemburg gehört zu den Gewinnern des Steuerwettbewerbs bei Abgaben auf spezielle Güter wie Kraftstoffe, Tabakwaren und Kaffee. Das Papier modelliert das Aufkommen der Steuern auf Benzin und Diesel in Luxemburg auf der Basis von Daten des Jahres 2005. Abweichend von bisherigen Studien...

Im Hinblick auf eine mögliche Reform des kommunalen Finanzausgleichs in Niedersachsen weist dieser Beitrag auf den Zusammenhang zwischen diesem System und den Gewerbesteuerhebesätzen hin. Dafür werden die vom kommunalen Finanzausgleich ausgehenden Anreizeffekte auf die kommunale Hebesatzwahl...

To analyse the impacts of North-South globalization (NSG) and North-North globalization (NNG) upon social segmentation in advanced economies, we build a model in which (i) households differ in their skill and capital endowments, and (ii) there is a minimal consumption under which they are...

I analyze international tax competition in a framework of dynamic optimal taxation for strategically competing governments. The global capital stock is determined endogenously as in a neo-classical growth model. With perfect commitment and a complete tax system (where all factors of production...

We consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility, modeled as mobile and immobile capital. An agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed...