Consider an agent facing a risky distribution of losses who can change this distribution by exerting some effort. Should be exert more effort when he becomes more risk-averse? For instance, should we expect more risk-averse drivers to drive more cautiously? In this paper, we give sufficient...

We examine the effect of bilateral trade in a concentrated industry under Cournot competition, when firms are regulated by national agencies who care about national social welfare. We allow for differences in costs and market sizes, and for asymmetric information between regulatory agencies and...

We investigate in this paper the attitude towards risk of bettors in British horce races. The model we use allows us to go beyond the expected utility framework and to explore various alternative proposals by estimating a multinomial model on 34443-race dataset. We find that rank-dependant...

This paper attemps to rationalize the use of insurance covenants in financial contracts, and shows how external financing generates a demand for insurance by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. In our model, the entrepreneur needs external financing for a risky project that can be affected by an...

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions where conmmitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption in village economies of less developped countries. Households can insure through both formal contracts and informal agreements, that...