This paper shows that the properties of nonlinear transformations of a fractionally integrated process depend strongly on whether the initial series is stationary or not. Transforming a stationary Gaussian I(d) process with d 0 leads to a long-memory process with the same or a smaller...

We document the importance of the choice of error measure (percentage vs. logarithmic errors) for the comparison of alternative valuation procedures. We demonstrate for several multiple valuation methods (averaging with the arithmetic mean, harmonic mean, median, geometric mean) that the ranking...

We investigate biases of valuation methods and document that these depend largely on the choice of error measure (percentage vs. logarithmic errors) used to compare valuation procedures. We analyze four multiple valuation methods (averaging with the arithmetic mean, harmonic mean, median, and...

We perform an experiment in which subjects bid for participating in a vote. The setting precludes conflicts of interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have only instrumental reasons to vote and form correct...

This note provides a proof of Granger's (1986) error correction model for fractionally cointegrated variables and points out a necessary assumption that has not been noted before. Moreover, a simpler, alternative error correction model is proposed which can be employed to estimate fractionally...

Voting and non-voting shares of ten German companies are analyzed for fractional cointegration. It turns out that seven pairs of price series are fractionally cointegrated, which means that for each pair there is a linear combination of the two series that is a long-memory process. If two stocks...

This paper reports on an extensive Monte Carlo study of seven residual-based tests of the hypothesis of no cointegration. Critical values and the power of the tests under the alternative of fractional cointegration are simulated and compared. It turns out that the Phillips-Perron t-test when...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...