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Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic $2\times 2$ game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622500
Consider a large population of individuals that are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2x2 game such as Matching Pennies with fixed roles assigned in the game. Some learn by sampling previous play of a finite number of other individuals in the same role. We analyze population dynamics...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032139
The effect that exogenous mistakes, made by players choosing their strategies, have on the dynamic stability for the replicator dynamic is analyzed for both asymmetric and symmetric normal form games. Through these perturbed games, the dynamic solution concept of limit asymptotic stability is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968236
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153592
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515727
We investigate games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning processes. We show that when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and so place greater weight on more recent experience that the time average of play often converges in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369088
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408630
Brown and von Neumann introduced a dynamical system that converges to saddle points of zero sum games with finitely many strategies. Nash used the mapping underlying these dynamics to prove existence of equilibria in general games. The resulting Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics are a benchmark...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408827
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409095
This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large society of rational agents. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poison processes. Each agent forms his belief...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463493