We model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials. We investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one's potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in...

We model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials. We investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one's potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in...

This paper examines the role of the player type distributions in repeated zero sum games of incomplete information with discounting of payoffs. In particular the strategic "sufficiency" of the posterior distributions for histories and the Limiting properties of the posterior sequence are...

This paper investigates the contract design problem of a producer when he purchases parts from a supplier, and there is incomplete information regarding the quality of the parts. This is the first game-theoretic model of quality control that captures this informational asymmetry. We focus on two...

In this paper, a Cournot game in an oligopolistic market with incomplete information is considered. The market consists of some producers that compete for getting higher payoffs. For optimal decision making, each player needs to estimate its rivals’ behaviors. This estimation is carried out...

In recent years, final-offer arbitration (FOA) has become an increasingly frequent means of resolving labor disputes in the private and public sectors. The present paper models FOA when each disputant has private information bearing on the true value of the case. The model characterizes the...

Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1994.