We offer a new perspective on games of irreversible investment under uncertainty in continuous time. The basis is a particular approach to solve the involved stochastic optimal control problems which allows to establish existence and uniqueness of an oligopolistic open loop equilibrium in a very...

In his book on 'Market Microstructure' Spulber presented some strange results with respect to the impact of the substitutability parameter in an intermediation model with differentiated products and inputs. Intuitively, effects in the product and the input market should be similar: if firms...

We propose a dynamic model for describing clustering behaviors on a cyclic game, in which the same species form a cluster to compete. The rates of consuming the prey depend not only on the individual competing ability v, but also on the two interacting cluster’s sizes. The fragmentation and...

Two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces are known to have undiscounted values. We study such games under the assumption that one or both players observe the actions of their opponent after some time-dependent delay. We develop criteria for the rate of growth of...

<Para ID="Par1">An autonomous correlation device in a multistage game is a device that, before every stage, chooses for each player a private signal, possibly in a correlated way, and reveals to each player the signal chosen for him. The chosen signals depend only on previous signals, and not on the actions of...</para>

We present an example of a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states, finitely many players and actions, and deterministic transitions, that possesses no measurable stationary equilibria, or even stationary approximate equilibria. The example is robust to perturbations of the...

We present a discrete model of two-person constant-sum dynamic strategic market game. We show that for every value of discount factor the game with discounted rewards possesses a pure stationary strategy equilibrium. Optimal strategies have some useful properties, such as Lipschitz property and...

We present an example of a discounted stochastic game with a continuum of states, finitely many players and actions, and deterministic transitions, that possesses no measurable stationary equilibria, or even stationary approximate equilibria. The example is robust to perturbations of the...

Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an...