Im klassischen Modell von Diamond und Dybvig (1983) werden Bank-runs durch sich selbst erfüllende pessimistische Erwartungen der Anleger provoziert. Sie sind damit ein Sonnenflecken-Phänomen. Die spekulativen Runs können u.a. durch eine Einlagenversicherung vermieden werden. Allerdings...

Macroprudential policies – caps on loan to value ratios, limits on credit growth and other balance sheets restrictions, (countercyclical) capital and reserve requirements and surcharges, and Pigouvian levies – have become part of the policy paradigm in emerging markets and advanced...

In this paper, we develop an alternative approach to estimate the size of the shadow banking system, using official data reported to the IMF complemented by other data sources. We base our alternative approach on the expansion of the noncore liabilities concept developed in recent literature to...

Bank interest rate spreads in Solomon Islands are high by regional standards. This paper examines the determinants of bank interest rates including bank specific, banking sector, macroeconomic, and legal indicators. The results show that the scale of operation, overhead costs, concentration...

Die Analyse der so genannten Mikrostruktur von Finanzmärkten und ihr Einfluss auf das Marktergebnis haben in den letzten Jahren im Fokus der Finanzmarktforschung gestanden. Hinsichtlich der Entwicklung, Gestaltung und Regulierung von Finanzsystemen ist jedoch eine Erweiterung des Blickfeldes...

Peer-to-peer lending represents a low-cost credit market. This is an important novelty because functions traditionally exercised by banks such as lot-size transformation are now exercised in a marketplace by customers themselves. The present article explains the functionality of such...

I study the constrained efficient allocations of a simple model of risk sharing and capital flows across countries assuming that each country cannot commit to fully repay its contract obligations. In the model, the degree of risk sharing and the amount of investment are interdependent. It is...