Showing 1 - 10 of 157
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986632
In the basic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994, Rubio and Ulph 2006) extended by international trade, self- enforcing - or stable - IEAs may comprise up to 60% of all countries (Eichner and Pethig 2013). But these IEAs reduce total emissions only slightly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850531
Capital tax competition is known to result in inefficiently low tax rates and an undersupply of public goods. The provision of public goods and with it the welfare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson tax-competition model this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850532
In a multi-country model with mobile capital and global pollution this paper analyzes the stability of self-enforcing environmental agreements (IEAs) when the coalition formed by the signatory countries plays Nash. In accordance with previous environmental literature we show that there exists a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850535
The basic model of the literature on self-enforcing international environmental agreements is a model of autarkic countries. We extend that model by international trade and investigate its impact on the performance of ’Nash’ coalitions and on their stability, in particular, in a general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850537
In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of selfenforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850538
In the basic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994, Rubio and Ulph 2006) extended by international trade, self-enforcing - or stable - IEAs may comprise up to 60% of all countries (Eichner and Pethig 2013). But these IEAs reduce total emissions only slightly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877766
Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877774
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948902
In a model of the world economy with identical countries and trade, Eichner and Pethig show that self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) may comprise up to 60% of all countries when the group of signatories curb domestic emissions via demand-side cap-and-trade policy....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010646