We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a public facility among agents who have different needs for it. We base two characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule on smallest-cost consistency. Namely, (i) the rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of equals,...

We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in Q J Econ 92:671–687, <CitationRef CitationID="CR31">1978</CitationRef>) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though...</citationref>

We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419–1427, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2006</CitationRef>) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are...</citationref>

Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...

The fixed-route traveling salesman problem with appointments, simply the appointment problem, is concerned with the following situation. Starting from home, a traveller makes a scheduled visit to a set of sponsors and returns home. If a sponsor in the route cancels her appointment, the traveller...

We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of the queueing problem. As a consequence, we provide alternative characterizations of the k-pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [13]). First, we introduce the...

A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the...