This paper examines communication in a two-period principal/agent model in which the agent receives a private signal about the second outcome before the first outcome is realized. No communication is compared with communication at three possible dates: before the first outcome (early), at the...

We review and critically examine the standard approach to equity valuation using a constant risk-adjusted cost of capital, and we develop a new valuation approach discounting risk-adjusted fundamentals, such as expected free cash flows and residual operating income, using nominal zero-coupon...

In a finite time horizon, incomplete market, continuous-time setting with dividends and investor incomes governed by arithmetic Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium risk-free rate and stock price for an economy with finitely many heterogeneous CARA investors and...

In an incomplete continuous-time securities market with uncertainty generated by Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium interest rate and market price of risk processes. The economy has a finite number of heterogeneous exponential utility investors, who receive...

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm's capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders' own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which...

A bond-type effect which supplements the well-known coupon effect on yield to maturity is presented in this paper. By analyzing annuity bonds, ser ial bonds, and fixed-coupon bonds, it is shown that the bond-type eff ect is substantially larger than the coupon effect, which would hardl y be...

We examine the interaction between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals in a stewardship setting. Contracting includes multiple rounds of renegotiation based on contractible accounting information and non-contractible but more timely non-accounting information. We show that accounting...