The selection of either a pull or a push price promotion has mainly been investigated in contexts where manufacturers offer deals to consumers at the time of purchase or offer trade deals to retailers. This paper extends this framework to where manufacturers can offer either trade deals or...

This paper studies the optimal choice of promotional partners in a three-firm market where two firms sell complementary products and a third firm sells an independent product. Game-theoretic models are developed to investigate the following scenarios: no promotional partnership, partnership...

This paper provides an econometric analysis of franchise fees and royalties using a sample of franchises in Québec. Our results do not reveal any evidence of simultaneity between franchise fees and royalties. These elements act as a signal, from franchiser and franchisee, and deal with moral...

The main question of this research is: Who should undertake promotional and brand-image advertising if the franchisor and franchisees act so as to maximize their respective profits? To address this question, we study a two-stage advertising game between a franchisor and two adjacent franchisees....

The authors develop a theoretical framework to explain conflict in supplier-retailer relationships. In addition to traditional influence strategy variables, the framework links conflict to retailer dependence and supplier formalization. The framework is empirically tested in the Cameroonian...

<heading implicit="yes" id="h1" level="1" format="display">Abstract</heading> This paper attempts to estimate the effect of corruption on the flows of exports and imports of African countries. Using the gravity model approach and annual data for the period 1998-2007, we obtain negative and statistically significant correlations between the values of exports and...

The effects of price competition and advertising spillover on franchisees' decision to cooperate and on franchisor's contractual preferences are investigated. We show that the franchisees' decision to cooperate or not depends on the type of franchise contracts. Under exclusive territory...