-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual …

it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex …-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness …

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate … problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the payoffs of a matching can be …

game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …

game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair …