Thomas Russell and Dwight Jaffee argue that private markets should be able to insure against catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina or 9/11, but if government must, then it should follow the same actuarially based pricing and reserving rules that would be followed by a competitive private market.

This paper examines various explanations for the increase in the degree of regulation of the auto industry in the last ten years. Using cross section data for the State of California, the paper confirms earlier findings for the State of Massachusetts that the demand for auto insurance is highly...

This paper uses the tools of welfare economics to analyse the appropriate mix of private sector and government responses to catastrophic events. In particular, we examine the appropriate roles of post-disaster government aid, private insurance and mitigation activities. The analysis focuses on...

This paper examines the causes of the failure of the private market for catastrophe insurance and examines some public solutions. Although the standard explanations of insurance market failure (adverse selection and moral hazard, large imprecise risks) are present, we argue that the primary...