In this note I prove the existence of the optimal-pay auction when signals are correlated.

We discuss the issue, raised by Mas-Colell (1991) whether the local uniqueness (relative to the L∞ topology) may be a generic property of equilibria in incomplete markets economies with a continuum of states.

We demonstrate the existence of an optimal, individually rational, and incentive compatible selling mechanism for a multiproduct monopolist facing a market populated by consumers with budget constraints. Our main contribution is to show that, in general, when facing consumers with budget...

In this note I show that pratically any increasing function is the equilibrium bidding function of a symmetric first-price auction. It is like a Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu for auctions

It is an easy task for most commodity spaces, to find examples of strictly monotonic preference relations. For example, in the space of bounded sequences of real numbers.. However, it is not easy for spaces like the space of bounded functions defined in the real interval [0, 1]. In this note we...

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result.

We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with separable metric strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such metric game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension G is payoff secure. We also establish that if...