This paper reviews a recent strand of the literature on vertical restraints, that has focused on the anti-competitive effects of minimum (and fixed) resale price maintenance in settings with both inter- and intra-brand competition. In particular, we identify a set of situations with...

A supplier is known to be subject to opportunism when contracting secretly with downstream competitors, particularly when downstream firms have "passive beliefs." We stress that in many situations, an equilibrium with passive beliefs may not exist and passive beliefs appear less plausible than...

Whereas non-price restrictions such as exclusive territories are often tolerated while Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) is rather unanimously forbidden, the economic analysis shows so far that both types of restraints have positive and negative effects on welfare, in such a way that the balance is...

By the begining of 1997 resale price maintenance was legally enforceable on only two groups of products in the UK, books and non-prescription medicines. The Net Book Agreement had been in existence substantially unchanged, for close on 100 years. It amounted to a horizontal agreement amongst...

We study a manufacturer-retailer relationship where, besides the adverse selection and moral hazard components, it is explicitly considered a type-dependent participation constraint capturing the shadow cost of exclusive dealings. The welfare effects of contracts based on both retail price and...

After the Net Book Agreement was abandoned in 1995 and struck down by the Restrictive Practices Court in 1997, retail book prices were widely expected to fall. Despite deeper and wider retail discounts, official indices show that book prices have subsequently risen more than general inflation....

The paper revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyse the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of...

The paper sets out why we consider that the legal framework in the EU amplifies what are in reality relatively small differences in thinking around RPM. Primarily, this is because it asks economists, in the name of legal certainty, to draw a false dichotomy between agreements and practices which...

We study a specific model of competing manufacturer-retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with non-market externalities at the downstream level. In this simple framework we show that a “laissez- faire" approach towards vertical price control might harm consumers...