This paper studies the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist that has private information about demand conditions. In particular, we consider the regulation of a two-product monopolist with interdependent demands when it has better information concerning the demand of one product than the...

In this paper, we analyze the optimal regulation policy when the regulated firm has better information concerning the market demand than the regulator. We show that introducing a cost on public funds into the Planner's objective function does not lead to qualitative results similar to those...

In this paper we study the problem of how to regulate a monopolist whose costs are unknown to the regulator. The total cost incurred by the firm depends on the quantity produced, on the level of quality, which is observable and verifiable, as well as on some privately known technological...

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

This paper analyzes how the pricing policy of an incumbent may signal information not only on the demand level but also on the demand composition. A signalling game with two periods and two players (an established firm and a potential entrant) is considered. The potential entrant has incomplete...

This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions — involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different...