In this paper, we analyze the optimal regulation policy when the regulated firm has better information concerning the market demand than the regulator. We show that introducing a cost on public funds into the Planner's objective function does not lead to qualitative results similar to those...

This paper studies the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist that has private information about demand conditions. In particular, we consider the regulation of a two-product monopolist with interdependent demands when it has better information concerning the demand of one product than the...

In this paper we study the problem of how to regulate a monopolist whose costs are unknown to the regulator. The total cost incurred by the firm depends on the quantity produced, on the level of quality, which is observable and verifiable, as well as on some privately known technological...

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

This paper shows how the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination may be decomposed into two effects: a misallocation effect and an output effect. It also presents a geometrical analysis which shows how the welfare properties of third-degree price discrimination must be assessed...

The strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. We show that under simultaneous price competition and under leader-follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm being the leader), the pricing policy game is not, as stated...

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)