This paper investigates the role of aggregate shocks on household consumption and labor supply. It posits, estimates and tests a model where the equilibrium behavior of agents sometimes leads them to locate on the boundary of their respective choices sets. The framework is rich enough to nest...

This paper analyses how the wage and employment decisions of females are affected by past workforce participation and hours supplied. Our estimation methods exploit the fact that, when markets are complete, the Lagrange multiplier for an agent’s lifetime budget constraint always enters...

This paper is an empirical study of the market for managers, more specifically the effects of agency, human capital, and preferences on their promotion, tenure, turnover and compensation. From a large longitudinal data set compiled from observations on executives and their publicly listed firms,...

We provide empirical restrictions of a model of optimal order submissions in a limit order market. A trader's optimal order submission depends on the trader's valuation for the asset and the trade-offs between order prices, execution probabilities and picking off risks. The optimal order...

Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We find, controlling for...

This paper develops a new method for estimating the structural parameters of dynamic programming problems in which choices are discrete. The method reduces the computational burden of estimating such models. We show the valuation functions characterizing the expected future utility function...

This paper develops and implements a semiparametric estimator for investigating, with panel data, the importance of human capital accumulation, non-separable preferences of females and child care costs on females life-cycle fertility and labor supply behaviors. It presents a model in which the...

This article investigates the paradox of insider information and performance pay as it pertains to managerial compensation. The paradox is that managers are permitted to exploit their role as insiders for personal financial gain when simple directives issued by their board of directors could...