This paper explores the productivity and income distribution e.ects of asymmetric information and risk preferences on the credit market. A model of contract design in the presence of moral hazard is developed in which competitive, risk neutral lenders o.er contracts to risk averse agents who...

Recent theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that risk (especially covariant risk that is correlated across producers) may discourage both the supply of agricultural credit and the willingness of small holders to utilize available credit and enjoy the higher expected incomes credit could...

We evaluate the impact of agricultural land market liberalization policies in Latin America by empirically examining the degree to which the reforms have broken down the dependence of operational area on owned area. We use panel data sets from Honduras and Peru to estimate the relationship...

We develop a model of sorting and matching between borrowers and lenders across formal and informal credit markets in a developing country context. We highlight the role of risk both on credit access and sectoral choice. We examine how activity and sectoral choice vary across agents with...

This paper evaluates the performance of a rural credit market in Peru. We develop a model that shows that collateral requirements imposed by lenders in response to asymmetric information can lead not just to quantity rationing but also to transaction cost rationing and risk rationing. Just like...

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/03/05.

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics.