We consider the design of contracts in a principal-agent setting with two agents where each agent privately observes and reports to the principal a signal regarding the actions taken. We consider two cases: one where the agents observe the same signal and one where the agents observe different...

We analyze the effect of external financing concerns on managers' financial reporting behavior prior to management buyouts (MBOs). Prior studies hypothesize that managers intending to undertake an MBO have an incentive to manage earnings downward to reduce the purchase price. We hypothesize that...

This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers....

This paper considers how the presence of a speculative investor, who bets on a firm's future earnings report, affects how the firm's management manipulates that report. We examine the influence of the speculator's information on earnings management behavior, quality of reported earnings, and...

This article analyzes the relation between product quality, the cost of quality, and the information that can be contracted upon. We consider a setting where a risk neutral supplier sells an intermediate product to a risk neutral buyer. The supplier incurs prevention costs to reduce the...

This paper examines the relationship between product architecture, supply-chain performance metrics, and supply-chain efficiency. We model the contracting relationship between a supplier and a buyer. The supplier is privately informed about the outcome of his design/production investment. The...