Mit Blick auf die Funktionslogik moderner Wirtschaftsgesellschaften zielt Karl Homanns Ansatz einer „oekonomischen Ethik“ auf die Rekonstruktion der Moral „in terms of economics“, um so moralische Forderungen direkt in die Funktionslogik der Oekonomie integrieren zu koennen. Moral, so...

We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the television game show <i>Golden Balls</i>. At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic prisoner's dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is...

We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a n-round Prisoner's Dilemma game with its immediate neighbors, after that, based...

Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisoner's Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices by the other pair. Considering this as a...

We study a system in which N agents have to decide between two strategies θi(i ∈ 1 … N), for defection or cooperation, when interacting with other n agents (either spatial neighbors or randomly chosen ones). After each round, they update their strategy responding nonlinearly to two...

This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, but must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the...

This study investigates whether cooperation in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is sensitive to the complexity of cooperative strategies. An experimental design which allows manipulations of the complexity of these strategies by making either the cooperate action or the defect action...

The problems of how self-interested players can cooperate despite incentives to defect, and how players can coordinate despite the presence of multiple equilibria, are among the oldest and most fundamental in game theory. In this report, we demonstrate that a plausible and even natural...