This paper analyses strategic fiscal policy-making within the context of the standard two-country-two-good real trade model developped by Turnovsky (1988). Introducing asymmetry between the two countries and assuming that one country acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the other one, we...

Cet article a pour but de demontrer la viabilite des politique de taxation du capital dans une economie mondiale a deux pays avec imparfaite substituabilite des capitaux. Les agents sont altruistes et donnent une partie de leur patrimoine a leurs enfants. La presence d'une contrainte sur les...

Nous developpons un modele dans lequel les gouvernement peuvent s'exhanger des informations sur les investissements effectues sur leur territoire par les agents etrangers.

Models of tax competition usually assume a single period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition, and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interactions between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy...

Models of tax competition usually assume a single period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition, and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interaction between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy...

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse—with synchronized elections, i.e....

This paper investigates the sustainability of fiscal co-ordination between two regions according to three criteria of co-ordination: tax harmonization, fiscal cooperation and bargaining. We show that in a two-region model in which regions differ in size, bargaining is the only sustainable...

Dans cet article, nous dérivons de façon endogène le phénomène de contrainte budgétaire molle dans le cadre d’une fédération lorsque les décisions budgétaires sont prises au niveau décentralisé. Dans ce modèle, la mollesse de la contrainte budgétaire régionale découle de...

We introduce a new way to model the Bismarckian social insuance system, stressing its corporatist dimension. Comparing the Beveridgean, Bismarckian and Liberal systems according to the majority voting rule, we show that for a given distribution of risks inside society, the Liberal system wins if...