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Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism: double-dealing, whistle-blowing and extortion are significant uncertainties for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators may use an asymmetric design of (criminal) sanctions and leniency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010954409
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009417629
Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism. Moreover, denunciation and extortion add another layer of uncertainty for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators can use an asymmetric design of criminal sanctions to amplify these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646635
Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism: double-dealing, whistle-blowing and extortion are significant uncertainties for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators may use an asymmetric design of (criminal) sanctions and leniency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635365
This paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646634
Even though high penalties for corruption offences have a deterrent and preventive effect, they also entrap bribe-takers and bribe-givers in their corrupt relationship. Moreover, pending penalties can be misused to make threats against opportunistic behavior and can thus stabilize risky bribe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646638
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067888
Even though high penalties for corruption offences have a deterrent and preventive effect, they also entrap bribe-takers and bribe-givers in their corrupt relationship. Moreover, pending penalties can be misused to make threats against opportunistic behavior and can thus stabilize risky bribe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005163007
This paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005227723
Die jüngsten Korruptionsskandale haben in der Öffentlichkeit das Bewusstsein dafür geschärft, dass Politiker und Beamte nicht immer der Allgemeinheit dienen, sondern für staatliche oder kommunale Aufträge sowie Steuernachlässe Bestechungsgelder (oder illegale Parteispenden) annehmen oder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418409