Stimulus-response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) models are estimated with experimental data from sender-receiver games and compared using the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-nested hypotheses. Depending on a certain adjustment parameter, the P-test favors the SR model, the BBL model...

This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender-receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the...

This paper uses experiments to investigate the evolution of communication. We consider simple games of information transmission in which the interests of senders and receivers are imperfectly aligned. We show that under four canonical incentive conditions the no-communication hypothesis can be...

We report experimental results on the role of preplay communication in a one-shot, symmetric battle of the sexes game. We conducted games in which there was no communication, and we studied the effects of three different communication structures: one-way communication with one round of messages...

This paper provides experimental evidence on forward induction as a refinement criterion. In the basic extensive form, one of the two players chooses to play a battle-of-the-sexes game or to receive a certain payoff. According to forward induction, choosing to play the game is a signal about...