This paper analyzes a Hotelling-type game in a mixed oligopoly, where firms can either enter the market in period 1, facing demand uncertainty, or postpone their entry, in order to acquire complete information. It is shown that, for a high (low) level of uncertainty, there is a pure...

Based on a Hotelling-type model, this paper analyzes a differential game where two firms engage in quality-enhancing research and development (R&D). The analysis is formulated in terms of open-loop and feedback solutions. We find that the open-loop stationary levels of R&D and quality are...

In this paper, we develop a model of endogenous R&D in vertical product innovation by an original manufacturer facing Bertrand competition from parallel importer(s). We show that if parallel imports are prohibited among the distributors' countries and there is at least one country other than the...

This paper studies the case where an outside patent holder licenses its vertical product innovation to two Cournot competitors. It is found that, under a fixed-fee contract, the patent holder prefers exclusive licensing. However, under a royalty or two‐part tariff contract, the patent holder...

We consider a three-stage game where a public firm and a private firm choose R&D, location, and price, under the assumption that R&D spillovers rely on their locations. We show that, in equilibrium, whether the public firm engages in innovation more aggressively than the private firm depends on...

In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing. We show that, with licensing, the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984)...

This paper incorporates a durable-good monopoly model and re-examines the argument on licensing contracts. It shows that, from the perspective of the non-producing patent holder, the optimal licensing contract depends on the nature and the degree of the innovations. Specifically, for small...