In a three-country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country <i>reverses</i> the welfare effects of a merger in the...

This paper analyzes a game of trade policy (called Bilateralism) between three countries in which each country chooses whether to liberalize trade preferentially in the form of a Customs Union (CU), multilaterally, or not at all. We also analyze a restricted version of this game (called...

This paper compares equilibrium outcomes of two games of trade liberalization. In the Bilateralism game, countries choose whether to liberalize trade preferentially via a customs union (CU ), multilaterally, or not at all. The Multilateralism game is a restricted version of the Bilateralism game...

We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either...

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and contrast the welfare effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) on member and non-member countries when tariffs of both members and non-members are endogenously determined. It also aims to provide sufficient...

In a game of endogenous trade agreements, we examine whether the pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) affects the prospects of global free trade differently than the pursuit of customs unions (CUs). Our analysis is driven by a fundamental difference between these two types of preferential...

This paper compares stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization. In the FTA game, each country can form an FTA with either one of its trade partners, or both of them, or none of them. By contrast, in the No FTA game, each country must choose either no agreement or free trade....