The fertile application of cooperative game techniques to cost sharing problems on networks has so far concentrated on the Stand Alone core test of fairness and/or stability, and ignored many combinatorial optimization problems where this core can be empty. I submit there is much room for an...

We ask how to share the cost of finitely many public goods (items) among users with different needs: some smaller subsets of items are enough to serve the needs of each user, yet the cost of all items must be covered, even if this entails inefficiently paying for redundant items. Typical...

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable –though perhaps different– commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two...

Subsidy-free VCG mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations. The smallest efficiency loss satisfies . If is bounded away from , converges to zero exponentially in...

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...