This paper introduces a new notion of a “procedural” value for cooperative TU games. A procedural value is determined by an underlying procedure of sharing marginal contributions to coalitions formed by players joining in random order. We consider procedures under which players can only...

We present a simple game model of international environmental agreements and examine the effects of learning (resolution of uncertainty) on the stability of agreements. An agreement is said to be stable if no countries have an incentive to defect from it and free-ride. We have shown that whether...

In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf–Owen coalitional value. Copyright Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2014

According to the work of Faigle [3] a static Shapley value for games on matroids has been introduced in Bilbao, Driessen, Jiménez-Losada and Lebrón [1]. In this paper we present a dynamic Shapley value by using a dynamic model which is based on a recursive sequence of static models. In this...

According to the work of Faigle [3] a static Shapley value for games on matroids has been introduced in Bilbao, Driessen, Jiménez-Losada and Lebrón [1]. In this paper we present a dynamic Shapley value by using a dynamic model which is based on a recursive sequence of static models. In this...

The introduction of a {0,1}-valued game associated to a connected graph allows us to assign to each vertex a value of weighted connectivity according to the different solutions that for cooperative games are obtained by means of semivalues. The marginal contributions of each vertex to the...

Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games in which coalition formation is restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalizes permission structures. These games group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. The current...

A game on a convex geometry was introduced by Bilbao as a model of partial cooperation. We investigate some properties of the core of a game on a convex geometry. First, we show that if a game is quasi-convex, then the core is stable. This result can be seen as an extension of a result by...

In the classical model of cooperative games, it is considered that each coalition of players can form and cooperate to obtain its worth. However, we can think that in some situations this assumption is not real, that is, all the coalitions are not feasible. This suggests that it is necessary to...