We study information sales in financial markets with strategic risk-averse traders. The optimal selling mechanism is one of the following two: (i) sell to as many agents as possible very imprecise information; (ii) sell to a small number of agents information as precise as possible. As...

We study the relation between noise (liquidity traders, endowment shocks) and the aggregation of information in financial markets with large number of agents. We show that as long as noise increases with the number of agents, the limiting equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivial...

Drawing on the recent theoretical literature on credit rating agencies (CRAs), we provide a simple model that nests the following frictions: conflicts of interest between CRAs and in¬vestors, regulatory reliance on ratings, investor naiveté and opacity in the rating process. These frictions...

This paper studies asset markets in which ambiguity averse investors face Knightian uncertainty about expected payos. The same investors, however, might wish to resolve their uncertainty, although not risk, by just purchasing information. In these markets, uninformed and, hence, ambiguity...

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices...

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrele- vance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogenously) decides to become informed in equilibrium,...

This paper studies asset markets in which ambiguity averse investors face Knightian uncertainty about expected payoffs. The same investors, however, might wish to resolve their uncertainty, although not risk, by just purchasing information. In these markets, uninformed and, hence, ambiguity...

We study information sales in financial markets with strategic risk-averse traders. Our main result establishes that the optimal selling mechanism is one of the following two: (i) sell to as many agents as possible very imprecise information; (ii) sell to a single agent a signal as precise as...

This paper investigates the short to medium-term empirical relationships between the current account balances and a broad set of macroeconomic determinants in Serbia and selected CEE countries. Using novel model averaging techniques we focus the analysis to individual country’s data only. The...