In Ghirardato, Macheroni and MArcinaccri (GMM) propose a method for distinguishing between percieved ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which includes CEU and a-MEU and axiomatise a subclass of a-MEU preferences. We show that for Hurwicz...

In [7] Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci (GMM) propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. They axiomatize a...

We apply Pires’s coherence property between unconditional and conditional preferences that admit a CEU representation. In conjunction with consequentialism (only those outcomes on states which are still possible can matter for conditional preference) this implies that the conditional...

This paper studies how updating affects ambiguity attitude. In particular we focus on generalized Bayesian updating of the Jaffray–Philippe sub-class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences. We find conditions for ambiguity attitude to be the same before and after updating. A necessary and...

Raiffa (1961) has suggested that ambiguity aversion will cause a strict preference for randomization. We show that dynamic consistency implies that individuals will be indifferent to ex ante randomizations. On the other hand, it is possible for a dynamically-consistent ambiguity averse...

This paper studies how updating affects ambiguity-attitude. In particular we focus on the generalized Bayesian update of the Jaffray-Phillipe sub-class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences. We find conditions for ambiguity-attitude to be the same before and after updating. A necessary and...

In Ghirardato et al. (2004) [7], Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker[modifier letter apostrophe]s reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This...

We analyze three rules for updating neo-additive capacities. Only for Generalized Bayesian Updating is relative optimism the same for both updated and unconditional capacities. For updates of the other two, either the updated capacity is fully optimistic or fully pessimistic.