This paper develops a new axiomatic characterization of the Banzhaf index of power using four axioms from four different contributions to the area. A nice feature of the characterization is independence of the axioms showing importance of each of them in the exercise.

A sensitivity index quantifies the degree of smoothness with which it responds to fluctuations in the wishes of the members of a voting body. This paper characterizes the Banzhafï¾–Colemanï¾–Dubeyï¾–Shapley sensitivity index using a set of independent axioms. Bounds on the index for...

In this paper we establish equivalence between six collections of axioms that all characterize the Carreras-Coleman decisiveness index. Axioms in each of the different sets are shown to be independent.

I present a proof on finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's majority stable sets in multidimensional voting games in the case of differentiable utility functions on Rk and 3 players. The central hypothesis is based on a light separation property which is real common for family of functions...

This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles...

This paper develops a new axiomatic characterization of the Banzhaf index of power using four axioms from four different contributions to the area. A nice feature of the characterization is independence of the axioms showing importance of each of them in the exercise.

In this paper we establish equivalence between six collections of axioms that all characterize the Carreras-Coleman decisiveness index. Axioms in each of the different sets are shown to be independent.

Let A be a finite set of m alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players and let R^N be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Let u^N be a profile of utility functions for R^N. We define the NTU game V_u^N that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its...

This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game.We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles...