We model strategic competition between product differentiated oligopolists in a market with privately informed buyers as an abstract game over market situations. In this game each firm's strategy space consists of a set of catalogs--and each catalog in turn consists of a set of products and...

We formulate a club model where players' have identical single-peaked preferences over club sizes as a network formation game. For situations with "many" clubs, we provide necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the farsighted core and the direct (or myopic) core. With "too few" clubs, if...

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the...

We make two main contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions sufficient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, we show that if, in addition, agents' preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing called capacity...

We introduce a model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of networks, player preferences, rules of network formation, and a dominance relation on feasible networks. Rules may range from noncooperative, where players may only act unilaterally, to cooperative, where...