This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a strategic interaction between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium outcomes of our game based on an international duopoly model with...

This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a so-called timing game between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium results of our intergovernmental game based on an international duopoly...

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...

This paper examines how the opening of trade affects a countryfs welfare in the context of an international polluting duopoly model with transboundary stock pollution. In this framework, we show that trade liberalization can have quite different welfare implications, depending on the mode of...

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...

By analyzing a strategic interaction between environmentally-concerned governments, we examine how the competition mode of international polluting oligopoly is determined. We show that a resulting form of competition depends on the magnitudes of marginal damage costs and cross-border spillover...

In this note we examine if the proposition offered by <link rid="b5">Fershtman and Nitzan (1991)</link> and <link rid="b12">Wirl (1996)</link> in the context of a dynamic voluntary provision model with a linear production function can be generalized to a more general CES formulation. By comparing the steady-state stocks of a public good in...

Constructing a two-good (competitive and imperfectly-competitive goods), two-primary factor (capital and labor) and two-country model of international trade where the imperfectly-competitive sector is subject to increasing returns to scale, we establish an oligopolistic version of the...

Constructing a two-country, two-good, two-factor model of international trade under quasi-linear utility functions, we obtain a Modified Heckscher-Ohlin (MHO) Theorem that relates the trade pattern to the international distribution of factor endowments. We also show that the MHO Theorem survives...