In this note we examine if the proposition offered by <link rid="b5">Fershtman and Nitzan (1991)</link> and <link rid="b12">Wirl (1996)</link> in the context of a dynamic voluntary provision model with a linear production function can be generalized to a more general CES formulation. By comparing the steady-state stocks of a public good in...

This paper examines how the opening of trade affects a countryfs welfare in the context of an international polluting duopoly model with transboundary stock pollution. In this framework, we show that trade liberalization can have quite different welfare implications, depending on the mode of...

This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a strategic interaction between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium outcomes of our game based on an international duopoly model with...

This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international competition in a polluting good market by analyzing a so-called timing game between two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium results of our intergovernmental game based on an international duopoly...

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...

By analyzing a strategic interaction between environmentally-concerned governments, we examine how the competition mode of international polluting oligopoly is determined. We show that a resulting form of competition depends on the magnitudes of marginal damage costs and cross-border spillover...

This paper develops a model of an export oligopoly to examine the welfare effects of an export tax reduction and a production tax increase that makes the foreign country no-worse off. Whether or not entry into the oligopolistic industry is free, the proposed policy reform is shown to reduce...

This paper develops a two-country general equilibrium model to examine the welfare effect of tariff-tax reforms that fix the world price. We show that this reform improves welfare if an origin tax is adjusted, but that it reduces welfare if a destination tax is used. Moreover, this result is...

We prove two results on feedback equilibria under dynamic renewable resource duopoly. The linear feedback output is smallest, which sharply contrasts to the existing literature where it is largest. Moreover, prices in two feedback equilibria are higher than under monopoly.