<title>Abstract</title> <italic>This paper analyzes the incentives of duopolists to invest in advanced care technology under liability law. We establish that investment incentives under strict liability are in line with the taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), whereas the investment incentives under negligence...</italic>

This paper considers the incentives environmental liability creates to improve pollution abatement technology. Our analysis considers technical progress in end-of-pipe abatement and in the production technology used, thereby generalizing the approach taken by Endres et al. (Environ Resour Econ...

This paper establishes that a lobbying stage following investment decisions regarding abatement technology may imply a positive strategic effect of investment, pointing to relatively more investment in pollution abatement technologies than without lobbying. The intuition is that polluting firms...

This paper analyzes the implications of potential offenders caring about their relative status. We establish that subjects' status concerns can result in multiple-equilibrium crime rates and may modify the standard comparative-statics results regarding how the crime rate changes in response to a...

We explore the individual and joint explanatory power of concepts from economics, psychology, and criminology for criminal behavior. More precisely, we consider risk and time preferences, personality traits from psychology (Big Five and locus of control), and a self-control scale from...

In economic models, risk and social preferences are major determinants of criminal behavior. In criminology, low self-control is considered a fundamental cause of crime. Relating the arguments from both disciplines, this paper studies the relationship between self-control and both risk and...

This paper explores the advantages of focusing law enforcement on some locations when offenders can choose locations. The substitutability of different crimes from the offender's perspective is established as the key variable determining whether asymmetric enforcement is socially desirable. When...

Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for oenders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the...

This paper incorporates the reality that the bulk of law enforcement is decentralized while sanctions are chosen centrally, and explores the implications for the socially optimal sanction level. The presence of interregional externalities in the form of crime diversion induces socially excessive...