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Ziele, Bedingungen und Wirkungen beruflicher Sozialisation im Strafvollzug
Cyprian, Rüdiger - In: Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 10 (1977) 1, pp. 74-88
und dem Verhältnis der Gesellschaft zum Strafvollzug und den entlassenen Gefangenen begründet. In jedem Falle scheint es …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010733419
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Eine panelökonometrische Überprüfung der ökonomischen Theorie der Kriminalität mit deutschen Bundesländerdaten
Spengler, Hannes - Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2005
Gemäß der klassischen ökonomischen Theorie der Kriminalität sollte ein Anstieg der erwarteten Strafe (also des …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008464581
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Criminal Tax Law in the U.S. – A Model for Improving German Criminal Tax Law Enforcement?
Zahner, Matthias - In: CESifo DICE Report 4 (2006) 3, pp. 44-49
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037395
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The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract
Zhang, Boyu; Li, Cong; Silva, Hannelore; Bednarik, Peter; … - In: Experimental Economics 17 (2014) 2, pp. 285-303
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can … curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an … investigations, so far, considered peer punishment: players could impose fines on those who exploited them, at a cost to themselves …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988977
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Shifting the blame to a powerless intermediary
Oexl, Regine; Grossman, Zachary - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 3, pp. 306-312
We extend the results of Bartling and Fischbacher (Rev. Econ. Stud. 79(1):67–87, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2012</CitationRef>) by showing that, by delegating to an intermediary, a dictator facing an allocation decision can effectively shift blame onto the delegee even when doing so necessarily eliminates the possibility of a fair...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988979
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Adaptationist punishment in humans
Kurzban, Robert; DeScioli, Peter - In: Journal of Bioeconomics 15 (2013) 3, pp. 269-279
about these welfare gains is not logically licensed. In short, labeling punishment “altruistic” because it has the effect of … punishment can help solve collective action problems. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010989673
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Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game
Tan, Fangfang; Xiao, Erte - Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und öffentliche … - 2011
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer …, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the … independent third party mitigates the severity of punishment and consequently diminishes the effectiveness of punishment on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990343
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Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations
Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, David; Meier, Stephan; Sutter, … - In: Management Science 58 (2012) 5, pp. 948-960
punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of … competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and … mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990487
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Elected vs appointed public law enforcers
LANGLAIS, Eric; Obidzinski, Marie - EconomiX, Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre la Défense … - 2013
This paper revisits the issue of law enforcement and the design of monetary sanctions when the public law enforcer's incentives depart from those of a benevolent authority, which is the most frequent assumption made in the literature on crime deterrence. We …rst consider the case of an elected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010992370
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The Donor Problem
Abbink, Klaus; Ellman, Matthew - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851320