Paul Krugman has clarified the microeconomic underpinnings of both spatial economic agglomerations and regional imbalances at national and international levels. He has achieved this with a series of remarkably original papers and books that succeed in combining imperfect competition, increasing...

In this article we discuss the relationships between transportation infrastructure, firm location, agglomeration and regional development. We will argue that the spatial transaction costs faced by modern firms have changed over recent decades, and that this has changed the ways in which...

This article presents a summary of our conversation on the past, present and future of the new economic geography, which took place with the help of an interlocutor in San Juan, Puerto Rico in November 2002. Following the introduction, we explain what the new economic geography is, and we...

We empirically test some implications from location theory using the location of Los Angeles area gasoline stations in physical space and in the space of product attributes. We consider the effect of demand patterns, entry costs, and several proxies for competition -- the total number of...

This paper considers the role that urban spatial structure may play in the process of occupational segregation, and argues that neoclassical economic models of urban employment and residential location decisions have not considered the relationship between gender-based labor market status and...

In this paper, we study a two-stage location-then-price game where consumers are distributed piecewise uniformly, each piece being referred to as an interval.Although the firms face a coordination problem, it is obvious that, for any given locations and prices, there is a unique indifferent...

In this paper, we analyze a variant of the standard Hotelling model of spatial competition where firms first choose locations along the line and then, given these locations, compete in prices.Consumers have a finite reservation price and incur a quadratic transportation cost.We show that there...

In this paper we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a location-then-price game where firms first choose locations and after that compete for prices in two subsequent periods. Locations are thus seen as long term commitments. There are two types of consumers, each with different...