Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a...

Why many large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are becoming multinational entities? What are the welfare implications of this integration of markets for development donations? To answer these questions, we build a simple two-country model with horizontally differentiated NGOs competing...

Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a...

Is competition for donations between development NGOs good for welfare? We address this question in a monopolistic competition model à la Salop (1979). NGOs - defined by the non-distribution constraint - compete for donations from donors by exerting fundraising effort. If the market size is...

This paper builds a model of competition through fundraising between horizontally differentiated NGOs. NGOs allocate their time resource between working on the project and fundraising, which attracts private donations. If the market size is fixed, the fundraising levels increase with the number...

Why are many large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) becoming multinational entities? What are the welfare implications of this integration of markets for development donations? To answer these questions, we build a simple two-country model with horizontally differentiated NGOs competing in...

Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a...

Mission-driven nonprofi?t organizations compete for donations through fundrais- ing activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonpro?fits impose ex- ternalities on each others? output. This paper studies the design of sustainable voluntary cooperation agreements, using a...

This paper studies the stability of coordination between mission-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) competing for donations. We build a non-cooperative game-theoretic model of alliance formation between NGOs that compete through fundraising activities and impose externalities on each...

Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a...