We study a dynamic-contracting problem involving risk sharing between two parties -- the Proposer and the Responder -- who invest in a risky asset until an exogenous but random termination time. In any time period they must invest all their wealth in the risky asset, but they can share the...

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others. Thus, experiementation produces a public good...

We study a dynamic-contracting problem involving risk sharing between two parties – the Proposer and the Responder – who invest in a risky asset until an exogenous but random termination time. In any time period they must invest all their wealth in the risky asset, but they can share the...

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The main change from the single-agent problem is that an agent can now learn from the current experimentation of other agents. Information is therefore a...

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others. Thus, experiementation produces a public good...

Extending Barro (1999) and Luttmer & Mariotti (2003), we introduce a new model of time preferences: the instantaneous-gratiï¬cation model. This model applies tractably to a much wider range of settings than existing models. It applies to both complete- and incomplete-market settings and it...

This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key...

The stochastic evolution of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms. We show that several effects are at work. The state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater. Since joint payoffs are related to joint product-market profits less joint effort...

The paper presents two models of races in which there is both technological uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors. The authors' aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them. In the principal model, which is of a...