Showing 1 - 10 of 556
This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes. Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided. Then the model is specialized axiomatically to capture...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991580
This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515741
This appendix applies the model in ”Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Frame-Work” to address the question: What do non-Bayesian updaters learn?
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126673
The literature on self-control problems has typically put forth models that imply behavior that is consistent with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Prefer- ence. Thus, while choice is hypothesized to be the outcome of some under- lying internal con.ict, the resulting choices are perfectly consistent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443368
The literature on self-control problems has typically concentrated on immediate temptations. This paper studies a Gul and Pesendorfer [13, 14] style model in which decision-makers are affected by temptations that lie in the future. While temptation is commonly understood to give rise to a demand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443373
In formalizing a ‘veil of ignorance’ type procedure, this paper considers how an agent’s preferences over a set of alternatives change as he is placed at an increasing ‘distance’ from the consequences of his choices. A definition for such ‘removed preferences’ is presented and its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779470
The temptation literature has provided models where desires attain satisfaction by commanding the agent’s attention. We consider a model of self-deception, where desires command the agent’s reasoning, leading her to rationalize and justify actions that eventually lead into temptation....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779484
The literature on self-control problems has typically put forth models that imply behavior that is consistent with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. We argue that when choice is the outcome of some underlying internal conflict, the resulting choices may not be perfectly consistent across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779488
This paper shows in an experiment that giving rates in a dictator game increase significantly if payments are offered with delay. We hypothesize that a temptation to be selfish may be at play in social preferences. We model this and demonstrate that our model is consistent with much of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779507
A robust finding in experiments on time preference is the magnitude effect: subjects tend to be more patient towards larger rewards. Using a calibration theorem, we argue against standard curvature-based explanations for the finding. We axiomatize a model of preferences over dated rewards that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779517