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This paper characterizes optimal policies in the presence of tax evasion and undocumented workers. In equilibrium, domestic workers may work exclusively in the formal sector or also in the informal sector. Surprisingly, in equilibrium, wages are always equalized between domestic and undocumented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574327
This paper characterizes optimal policies in the presence of tax evasion and undocumented workers. Equilibrium can be characterized as segmented or non-segmented, depending on whether domestic workers work exclusively in the formal sector (segmented) or also in the informal sector...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008546326
In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates a perverse effect associated with plea bargaining in which an increase in sanctions can lead to reduced deterrence. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037630
When parole boards learn whether inmates are rehabilitated by observing their behavior in prison, we show why they would release one inmate, while continuing to incarcerate another with a longer sentence, but who is otherwise observationally identical. This reflects that the longer a parole...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037633
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350545
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350564
Universities are engaged in many activities; primarily, research and teaching. Many states have instituted performance measures that focus on evaluating a university's success in teaching. We suggest that multitasking may be important in this context, and we consider research outcomes after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037632
In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates a perverse effect associated with plea bargaining in which an increase in sanctions can lead to reduced deterrence. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005485759
In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates a perverse effect associated with plea bargaining in which an increase in sanctions can lead to reduced deterrence. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597107
Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience-rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230328