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This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011080916
This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718277
This paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium, by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO's utility and production functions, we generate a number...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008469358
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO%u2019s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005089117
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay depends on both the size of his firm and the aggregate firm size. The model determines the level of CEO pay across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005690942
In the "size of stakes" view quantitatively formalized in Gabaix and Landier (2008), CEO compensation is determined in a competitive talent market, and reflects the size of firms affected by talent. This paper offers an empirical update on this view. The years 2004-2011, which include the recent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796625
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826545
In the "size of stakes" view quantitatively formalized in Gabaix and Landier (2008), CEO compensation is determined in a competitive talent market, and re flects the size of firms affected by talent. This paper offers empirical update on this view. The years 2004-2011, which include the recent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145470
This paper investigates whether the secular process of Structural Change - i.e. the broad shift away from manufacturing and towards services during the post war period - can simultaneously account for the Great Moderation and provide a mechanism for its unraveling. Based on detailed US sectoral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856583
of the noise distribution, utility function and reservation utility.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856587