Good managers can give firms a competitive edge with respect to their industry rivals. This paper studies how shareholders design the structure of corporate ownership optimally - i.e., how they provide incentives - in order to exploit the competitive effect of managerial skills. A central...

This paper evaluates quantitatively the macroeconomic implications of corporate governance institutions within a model where the size and distribution of firms and the structure of financial markets are jointly determined. If firms adapt their financing modes to economic conditions, aggregate...

The rise in intangible capital is a fundamental driver of the secular trend in US corporate cash holdings over the last decades. We construct a new measure of intangible capital and show that intangible capital is the most important firm-level determinant of corporate cash holdings. Our measure...

This paper develops a competitive equilibrium model of CEO compensation and industry dynamics. CEOs make product pricing and product improvement decisions subject to shareholders' compensation choices and idiosyncratic shocks to product quality. The choice of high-powered incentives optimally...

This paper explores the hypothesis that the rise in intangible capital is a fundamental driver of the secular trend in US corporate cash holdings over the last decades. Using a new measure, we show that intangible capital is the most important firm-level determinant of corporate cash holdings...

This paper uses the staggered changes of R&D tax credits across U.S. states and over time as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the impact of innovation on corporate liquidity. By generating plausibly independent variation in firms' incentive to invest in R&D, we are able to assess the...

This paper explores the implications of investors’ everyday mild feelings for aggregate asset returns. To this end, it introduces a novel class of state dependent preferences - happiness maintenance preferences - into the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) economy by allowing investors’...

This paper studies whether financial contracts exacerbate or mitigate agency conflicts among stakeholders. We consider a specific contractual provision, debt covenants, and examine how, by allocating control rights between shareholders and debtholders, debt covenants affect the employment...

Competitive sorting models of the CEO labor market (e.g., Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009)) predict that differences in CEO productive abilities, or "talent", should be an important determinant of CEO pay. However, measuring CEO talent empirically represents a major challenge. In this paper, we...

This paper constructs a simple dynamic asset pricing model which incorporates recent evidence on the influence of immediate emotions on risk preferences. Investors derive direct utility from both consumption and financial wealth and, consistent with the happiness maintenance feature documented...