This paper investigates the relationship between uniqueness of Nash equilibria and local stability with respect to the best-response dynamics in the cases of sum-aggregative and symmetric games. If strategies are equilibrium complements, local stability and uniqueness are the same formal...

This paper studies the global dynamics of a class of infinitely repeated two-player games in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in actions. We define an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a pure-strategy...

Estudiamos las implicaciones que tienen sobre la estabilidad del cartel los rendimientos de escala en presencia de productos diferenciados cuando las empresas compiten en precios. Mostramos que el cartel puede ser igualmente estable en presencia de un menor grado de diferenciación siempre que...

The Iranian electricity industry has been restructured following the global experiences. The main objective of restructuring is transition from natural monopoly towards competition in order to improve efficiency. Currently, the Iranian electricity market is performing as imperfect competition...

Noncooperative network-formation games in oligopolies analyze optimal connection structures that emerge when linking represent the appropriation of cost-reducing one-way externalities. These models reflect situations where one firm access to another firm’s (public or private) information and...

This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all...

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule ``imitate-if-better'' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...