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Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism: Theory and Suggestive Evidence

Svitkova, Katarina; Ortmann, Andreas - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2006

particular solution of this problem, certification, where an independent agency provides a costly signal, a certificate, to … nonprofit. The assumptions of our model are derived from stylized facts that we distilled from certification systems currently … literature on certification and provides results that are different from those reported up to now. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357507

Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism in Transition Economies: Evidence, Theory, and Open Questions

Ortmann, Andreas; Svítková, Katarína - In: Prague Economic Papers 2007 (2007) 2, pp. 99-114

the state, and that relies on the market only indirectly: Certification agencies force their members to reveal their (good …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036542

Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1993

Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766727

Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard

Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1991

Sales contracts emerge when a principal and an agent in amoral hazard environment cannot prevent themselves from renegotiating their contract. The renegotiation occurs after the agent chooses his unobservable effort, but before its consequences are realized. Unlike previous analyses, a contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766769

R&D Behavior and the Emergence of Fat Tailed Firm Size Distributions

Babutsidze, Zakaria - United Nations University-Maastricht Economic Research … - 2009

This paper presents a simple boundedly rational model of a firm and consumer behaviour. We formulate an entry game, where every firm decides on investing in R&D for inventing a new product that will appeal to certain group of consumers. The success depends on the amount of funds available for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856447

Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive

Harstad, R. M.; R. Selten. - In: VOPROSY ECONOMIKI 5 (2014)

Research in experimental economics has cogently challenged the fundamental precept of neoclassical economics that economic agents optimize. The last two decades have seen elaboration of boundedly rational models that try to move away from the optimization approach, in ways consistent with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860809

Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium

Arribas, Iván; Salvador, Amparo Urbano - Estructura de Recerca Interdisciplinar Comportament … - 2014

This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on private, delegated agency games...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948740

Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents

Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin G.; Popova, Vera - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019644

Do short-term laboratory experiments provide valid descriptions of long-term economic interactions? A study of Cournot markets

Normann, Hans-Theo; Requate, Till; Waichman, Israel - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2013

One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956750

Organization, Learning and Cooperation

Barr, Jason; Saraceno, Francesco - Sciences économiques, Sciences Po - 2004

This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, but must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929050

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