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We derive conditions on individual preferences and technology that give rise to a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental protection. We present a class of models (which captures a static model as well as an overlapping-generations model) in which individuals differ in...
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We analyze how, in representative democracies, income distribution influences the stringency of environmental policy and economic growth. Individuals (who differ in abilities) live for two periods, working when young and owning capital when old. Externalities are caused by a polluting factor....
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In this work we analyse the issue of optimal taxation and of policy changes in an endogenous growth model driven by public expenditure, in the presence of endogenous fertility and labour supply. While normative analysis confirms the Chamley-Judd result of zero capital income tax, positive...
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We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decision are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134520
In this paper we investigate the relationship between economic and population growth in an endogenous growth model driven by human capital accumulation à la Lucas (1988). Since we allow for endogenous population growth, we adopt the population criterion Relative Critical Level Utilitarianism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133585
Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities, and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010908111