In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to...

In this paper we study technology transfer (TT) in a duopoly model with heterogeneous goods under quantity and price competition. We prove that some but not all the properties of TT under homogeneous goods are preserved in our framework.

In this paper we present a model of an organization where agents can choose between productive and rent-seeking activities. We consider two governance institutions, single ownership and corporate governance or parliament rule. Applications include models of internal organization of a firm, of a...

We find that in a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical, compete in quantities and produce with constant returns, the percentage of wel-fare losses (PWL) is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases. However...

In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for...

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if...

We present a simple dynamic model of international trade and growth. Our equations linking exogenous and endogenous variables do not resemble those estimated by the empirical literature: Ours are not linear, despite the fact that our model is linear, they do not include variables used in this...