We present a model in which capital assets can only be owned by members of a relatively small politically connected elite ('the oligarchs'), each member of which faces a given risk of being expropriated, and we investigate the implications of such an imperfection of property rights for the...

The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms, and blocking may similarly be organized by an incentive compatible mediation plan. Nonemptiness is proven for games with a balanced structure

To analyze effects of imperfect property rights on economic growth, we consider economies where some fraction of capital can be owned only by local oligarchs, whose status is subject to political risk. Political risk decreases local capital and wages. Risk-averse oligarchs acquire safe foreign...

A scholar's greatest asset is his or her intuition about what questions to study and with what methodology. A scientific autobiography should shed some light on how this intuition grew and developed over time.

We present a model in which capital assets can only be owned by members of a small politically-connected elite ("the oligarchs"), each member of which faces a given risk of being expropriated, and we investigate the implications of such an imperfection of property rights for the transition to a...