Showing 1 - 10 of 21,688
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. The agent's performance evaluation is thereby incongruent, i.e. it does not perfectly reflect the relative contribution of the agent's multi-dimensional effort to firm's profit. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621240
This Paper examines optimal incentives and performance measurement in a setting where an agent has specific knowledge … choice of performance measures and incentives depends on the agent’s knowledge, environmental risk, technological uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504471
This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts.  It motivates the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body relationship and the relationships between Japanese automobile manufacturers and their subcontractors.  It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671389
, organizations endowed with firing threats significantly underperformed those using individual incentives. Our analysis also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817444
-powered incentives in the optimal contract. Secondly, complementing Itoh's findings, we conclude that even if there are no productive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968161
problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001487
leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852
Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765
This paper proposes a model which analyses not only the provision of incentives (see, e.g., Gershkov et. al 2006 and … old phase. By comparing the results of the classical incentives scheme with those of a rewarding incentives scheme, we can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562425
The finance literature views perks either as productivity enhancing expenditures or as a result of poor managerial control by shareholders. Using a corporate jet to attend a business meeting may be justified because of the returns generated for the firm; but flying on the same jet to reach a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008546021