We develop a model explaining the consolidation patterns in the agricultural biotechnology industry. Among different consolidation and cooperation mechanisms, we consider collaborative and licensing agreements, joint ventures, acquisitions, and exchanges of ownership and spin-offs. The key...

Optimal trade policy in an uncertain world is examined. Decision-maker attitudes toward uncertainty are represented in terms of the <link rid="b16">Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989)</link> maximin expected-utility (MMEU) model. The central result is that in a two-country, general-equilibrium setting with both trading partners...

This papers analyzes efficient regulatory design of a polluting firm who has two kinds of private information about its production environment. First, the firm has better information than the regulator regarding technological possibilities for controlling pollution; and second, some aspects of...

Optimal trade policy in an uncertain world is examined. Decision-maker attitudes toward uncertainty are represented in terms of the Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) maximin expected-utility (MMEU) model. The central result is that in a two-country, general-equilibrium setting with both trading partners...

We model a game between two players taking biosecurity actions and characterize the Nash equilibria and their properties for the cases of strategic complements and substitutes. Implications of the theoretical model are investigated using data for biosecurity behavior among producers...

Decision makers are frequently confronted with ambiguous risk information about activities with potential hazards. This may be a result of conflicting risk estimates from multiple sources or ambiguous risk information from a single source. The paper considers processing ambiguous risk...

The paper examines principal-agent relationships in uncertain environments where beliefs of the contracting parties (the regulator and the firm) are represented by sets of probabilities. In addition to fully characterizing the first-best and the second-best solutions, we examine optimality of...

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, May 2007, Volume 89, Issue 2.

We examine agricultural contracting parties' incentives to employ quality measurement. Quality measurement will be used if on-farm production of ``quality'' is sufficiently cheap, and quality measurement sufficiently informative. We qualitatively test these predictions with empirical observation...