In this paper we characterize strategy-proof voting schemes on Euclidean spaces. A voting scheme is strategy-proof whenever it is optimal for every agent to report his best alternative. Here the individual preferences underlying these best choices are separable and quadratic. It turns out that a...

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the...

This paper empirically tests the principal-agent model prediction that the use of performance measures for incentive purposes is affected by the agent’s risk aversion. We find that the use of both accounting and market performance measures in executive compensation contracts decreases as the...

Relationship management is becoming more important, also in direct marketing. Measuring the strength of relationships is relevant, since relationship strength can be used as a segmentation variable. However, in measuring relationship strength, mostly one or more behavioral indicators are used...

An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that truthful reports of agents’ types form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the directrevelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This paperprovides characterizations...

In a single framework, I address the question of the informational basis for evaluating social states. I particularly focus on information about individual welfare, individual preferences and individual (moral) judgments, but the model is also open to any other informational input deemed...

The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to...

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non-empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i''s own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff...

The purpose of this paper is to review and discuss the key improvements brought to OxGauss. Without having to install Gauss on his or her machine, the OxGauss user can run under Ox a wide range of Gauss programs and codes. Even with the console Ox version (free for academics), Gauss codes can...

This note represents results about the extent of teaching the history of economic thought at German language based universities. At the time when cuts need to be made, many universi ties are thought of cutting non-essential courses first, of which the history of economic thought might be...