We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a general social choice setting that allows for informationally interdependent valuations and for allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of...

We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after...

Europe has taken the global lead in the issuance of third generation (3G) licences for mobile telecommunications according to the UMTS/IMT-2000 family of standards. We survey the recent European UMTS licence auctions and compare their outcomes with the predictions of a simple auction model that...

We study auctions for an indivisble object. The outcome of the auction influences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent i is assumed to be a funciton of the agents' valuations. While agent's i valuation is private information to i, other valuations are not...